This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two di¤erent protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. Expected payo¤s conditional on a coalition may depend on the protocol: given a coalition of the apex player with a minor player, an egalitarian protocol yields a nearly equal split whereas a proportional protocol leads to a proportional split.
Introduction
An apex game is a simple n-player game with one major player (the apex player) and n ¡ 1¸3 minor players (also called base players). A winning coalition can be formed by the apex player together with at least one of the minor players or by all the minor players together. Apex games can be interpreted as weighted majority games in which the major player has n ¡ 2 votes, each of the n ¡ 1 minor players has one vote, and n ¡ 1 votes are required for a majority.
Since the apex player only needs one of the minor players he can play them o¤ against each other to obtain favorable terms. Each minor player has two options: either try to unite with the other minor players (and run the risk that one of the others yields to an advantageous o¤er of the apex player) or compete with them for the favor of the apex player. Apex games have received a lot of attention both in theory 1 and in experiments, and their importance may be compared to that of the prisoner's dilemma 2 . This paper addresses three questions concerning apex games: 1) What coalition(s) are likely to form? 2) How will the gains from cooperation be divided for each possible coalition?
3) What are the ex ante expected payo¤s for the players? There are very di¤erent answers in the literature to the …rst question. Some papers (Bennett, 1983; Morelli, 1998) predict that all minimal winning coalitions are possible, whereas others limit the possible outcomes to the coalition of all small players (Aumann and Myerson, 1988; Hart and Kurz, 1984) or to coalitions of the major player with a minor player (Chatterjee et al., 1993) .
As for the second question, equal division of gains seems indicated if all minor players form a coalition. If the apex player forms a coalition with a 1 Some of the theoretical literature will be reviewed in section 4.
2 Rapoport et al. (1979) put it the following way:
The centrality of the Apex player, which produces the con ‡ict faced by each Base player of whether to cooperate and trust all the remaining n-2 Base players or to do his best, negotiating from weakness, against the Apex player, has aroused intense interest in apex games, such that they may become to n-person experimental games what the Prisoner's Dilemma has been to twoperson noncooperative games. minor player, the division of gains is not so clear-cut. The answers given in the literature point either to the "egalitarian" split corresponding to the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) or to the "proportional" (to the number of votes) n ¡ 2 n ¡ 1 : 1 n ¡ 1 split that comes from observing that a small player can not expect more than 1 n ¡ 1 if all the minor players form a coalition. The bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, 1964) includes these two extremes and all outcomes in between.
Most of the literature has little to say about ex ante payo¤s. They are either very extreme (as the major player receives a payo¤ of zero) or undetermined (when several coalitions are possible, ex ante expected payo¤s depend on the likelihood of each coalition, and this is left undetermined). On the other hand, ex ante concepts like the Shapley value give no predictions about coalitions or division of gains. The current paper attempts to provide an answer to the three questions simultaneously.
In this paper a noncooperative procedure with random proposers (Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , Okada (1996) ) is used to model bargaining in apex games. Two types of protocol are examined: the "egalitarian" protocol in which each player is selected to be the proposer with equal probability, and the "proportional" protocol, in which each player is selected with a probability proportional to his number of votes 3 . The solution concept is stationary perfect equilibrium with symmetric strategies for the minor players.
Intuitively, the apex player should bene…t from a proportional protocol since he is chosen more often to be the proposer. However, we show that this is not the case: expected equilibrium payo¤s are proportional to the number of votes of the players for both protocols. The reason is that equilibrium strategies change so as to compensate changes in the protocol: if the protocol selects a player to be the proposer with a higher probability, the other players make o¤ers to him with a lower probability so that his ex ante expected payo¤ remains unchanged.
We also show that all minimal winning coalitions may form, and the probability of a coalition being formed depends on the protocol (the coalition of all minor players being more frequent under a proportional rule). Expected payo¤s conditional on a coalition of the major player and a minor player 3 This would be the case in a parliamentary system where the probability of a party being asked to form a government is proportional to the number of seats it holds. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) use a proportional protocol in one of their examples. Okada (1996) only considers the egalitarian protocol. depend on the protocol: for an egalitarian protocol, the expected division is "close" to the egalitarian division (and converges to it when the number of players tends to in…nity); for a proportional protocol, the expected division is proportional.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the model and the results, section 3 relates the resulting expected payo¤s to the kernel for the grand coalition, section 4 reviews some of the literature, section 5 discusses possible extensions and section 6 concludes.
2 Bargaining with random proposers in apex games
The Model
Apex games consist of one major player (the apex player) and n ¡ 1 minor players. If N = f1; 2; :::; ng and 1 is the apex player, then v(S) = 1 if either 1 2 S and Snf1g 6 = ;, or S = N nf1g. Apex games can be interpreted as weighted majority games in which the major player has n ¡ 2 votes, each minor player has 1 vote, and n ¡ 1 votes are required to obtain a majority 4 . Bargaining in apex games is modeled following Okada (1996) , which in turn extends the model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) . Given the underlying cooperative (apex) game (N; v), bargaining proceeds as follows: At every round t = 1; 2; ::: Nature selects a player randomly to be the proposer. This player proposes a coalition S µ N to which he belongs and a division of v(S), denoted by x S = (x S i ) i2S . The ith component x S i represents a payo¤ for player i in S: Given a proposal, the rest of players in S (called responders) accept or reject sequentially (the order does not a¤ect the results). If all players in S accept, the proposal is implemented and the game ends 5 . If at least one player rejects, the game proceeds to the next period in which nature selects a new proposer (always with the same probability distribution). Players are 4 This is of course only one of the many possible vectors of weights we can assign to the players. We have chosen a so-called homogeneous representation, in which all minimal winning colaitions have the same number of votes. 5 Okada (1996) allows bargaining to continue among the remaining players until no coalition that may be formed has a positive value. Ending the game after one coalition has been formed is a simplifying assumption that does not a¤ect the results for apex games.
risk-neutral and share a discount factor ± < 1 6 : Thus, if a proposal x S is accepted by all players in S at time t, each player in S receives a payo¤ ± t¡1 x S i . A player not in S remains a singleton and receives zero. A (pure) strategy for player i is a sequence ¾ i = (¾ t i ) 1 t=1 , where ¾ t i ; the tth round strategy of player i, prescribes (i) A proposal (S; x S ): (ii) A response function assigning "yes" or "no" to all possible proposals of the other players.
The solution concept is symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. A stationary perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium with the property that players follow the same strategy at every round t. Equilibrium strategies must be symmetric in a weak sense: each minor player proposes coalition N nf1g with the same probability. Notice that this does not impose any restriction on the payo¤s o¤ered or on the strategy of the major player.
Concerning the probability of players being selected to be proposers, we will call the probability vector used by Nature a protocol, and we will denote it by µ := (µ i ) i2N ; where µ i > 0 8i 2 N and P i2N µ i = 1: Two natural protocols suggest themselves: the egalitarian protocol µ E := ( 1 n ; :::; 1 n ); which selects each player with the same probability, and the proportional protocol µ P := ( ); which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes.
We will denote the noncooperative game described above G(N; v; µ; ±): We will think of v as the characteristic function of an apex game, unless otherwise speci…ed.
The equilibrium
The following lemma corresponds to theorem 1 in Okada (1996) . Even though the original theorem assumes the egalitarian protocol µ E ; it can be applied to any protocol µ: The proof is included for completeness.
Lemma 1 (Okada, 1996) Consider a zero-normalized, essential and superadditive 7 game (N; v). In any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G(N; v; µ; ±), every player i in N proposes a solution (S i ; y S i ) of the maximization problem 6 Alternatively, after a proposal is rejected the game ends with probability 1 ¡ ±. 
where w j is the equilibrium expected payo¤ of player j. Moreover, the proposal
Proof. For every i = 1; :::; n, let w j i be player i's equilibrium expected payo¤ conditional on player j becoming the proposer at time 1, and let m i be the maximum value of (1). We …rst show that w i i = m i : Subgame perfection implies w i i¸mi . In a subgame perfect equilibrium any player j must accept any proposal that gives him at least ±w j , thus player i can get at least m i :
Can player i get more than m i ? If player i proposes (S; y S ) at round 1 with y i > m i ; the proposal will be rejected (otherwise at least one responder j is getting less than ±w j and could do better by rejecting the proposal) and i will get ±w i : Since the characteristic function is superadditive we have P j2N w j v(N ): This implies that the pair (N; w); w = (w j ) j2N is a feasible proposal and thus we must have ±w i w i m i , therefore w Proof. From the proof of Lemma 1 we know that each player gets a strictly positive expected payo¤ as a proposer (m i¸( 1 ¡ ±)v(N ) > 0 for all i). As a responder, he can guarantee himself a payo¤ of zero by rejecting all proposals that are made to him. Since each player has a strictly positive probability of being selected to be the proposer (µ i > 0 for all i), this implies
Corollary 2 has the following implications for zero-normalized, superadditive and essential simple games 8 Corollary 3 Consider a zero-normalized, superadditive and essential simple game (N; v): In any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G(N; v; µ; ±); all players propose winning coalitions in which each responder is pivotal.
Proof. Proposing a losing coalition cannot be a solution of (1), since it would yield at most zero for the proposer and he can get at least 1 ¡ ± > 0 by proposing the grand coalition and o¤ering ±w j to each responder.
On the other hand, since by corollary 2 w i > 0 8i 2 N; a proposal including a responder who is not pivotal cannot be a solution of (1).
It does not follow from Corollary 3 that only minimal winning coalitions are proposed in equilibrium. In fact, a stationary perfect equilibrium may include proposals of coalitions in which the proposer is not pivotal (see Section 5.1). For apex games however only minimal winning coalitions are proposed, as Corollary 4 shows.
Corollary 4 If (N; v)
is an apex game, in any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G(N; v; µ; ±) all players propose minimal winning coalitions.
Proof. A winning but not minimal winning coalition in an apex game must contain the apex player and at least two minor players, thus at least two players in the coalition are not pivotal (the two minor players). If such a coalition would be proposed in equilibrium, at least one responder would not be pivotal, contradicting Corollary 3.
The following lemma describes some characteristics of the equilibrium that are common to the protocols that treat all the minor players equally.
Lemma 5 Consider an apex game (N; v) and a protocol µ such that µ i = µ j for all i; j 2 N nf1g: Let ¾ ¤ be a symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of the game G(N; v; µ; ±): Then the following holds: a) The apex player proposes each coalition f1; ig (i 6 = 1) with probability
In other words, if the protocol treats all minor players symmetrically and each minor player proposes coalition N nf1g with the same probability, then in equilibrium the apex player proposes to each minor player with the same probability and all the minor players have the same expected equilibrium payo¤ 9 .
Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 6 describes the symmetric stationary perfect equilibrium of the game for the egalitarian protocol; proposition 7 describes it for the proportional protocol. Both protocols satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 5, thus equilibrium expected payo¤ must be the same for all minor players. In the sequel we will denote equilibrium expected payo¤s by w m for a minor player and w a for the apex player.
Proposition 6
The unique symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of G(N; v; µ E ; ±) is as follows a) When selected as a proposer, the apex player proposes to form a coalition with each of the minor players with equal probability 10 . b) When a minor player is selected as a proposer, he randomizes between proposing a coalition with the apex player (with probability
) and with all other minor players.
These proposals are accepted and expected payo¤s are
for the apex player and 1 2n ¡ 3 for each minor player.
9
Remember that symmetry of the equilibrium imposes no requirements on the equilibrium strategy of the major player. As for the minor players, it constraints the probabilities of proposing coalitions, not the payo¤s o¤ered. Thus, if i and j are minor players, symmetry of the equilibrium together with the fact that only minimal winning coalitions are proposed implies that i includes j in a proposal with the same probability that j inlcudes i, but it does not require that i o¤ers to j the same payo¤ j o¤ers to i: Because of subgame perfection, we know that j would o¤er ±w j to j and j would o¤er ±w i to i, but symmetry of the equilibrium does not require w i = w j : 10 It su¢ces to describe the equilibrium strategies of the players by a probability distribution over the coalitions they propose. Lemma 1 implies that each responder j will accept any o¤er that gives him at least ±w j and will be o¤ered exactly ±w j . This fact together with the probability distribution used by the proposers determines (w j ) j2N , therefore we need to specify neither the payo¤s o¤ered to the responders nor the set of proposals players accept.
Proof. The equilibrium strategy of the apex player follows from Lemma 5. Corollary 4 leaves three possibilities for the minor players: they may propose a coalition with the apex player, a coalition including all the minor players, or they may randomize.
Suppose they propose a coalition to the apex player. The continuation payo¤s are then found from the following system of equations, where w a denotes the continuation payo¤ for the apex player and w m denotes the continuation payo¤ for a minor player:
The solution to this system of equations is
. When ± is close to 1, w a is close to 1 and w m is close to 0, thus this strategy combination cannot be an equilibrium (a minor player would prefer to form a coalition with the other minor players and get a payo¤ close to 1, instead of following his prescribed strategy and get a payo¤ close to zero).
Suppose each minor player proposes to the rest of the minor players. Then the continuation payo¤s are found from the following system of equations:
Clearly, w a < w m , thus these strategies can not constitute an equilibrium (a minor player would prefer to propose to the apex player).
Suppose a minor player proposes to the apex player with probabilitya nd to the other minor players with probability 1 ¡¸: The continuation payo¤s and¸are found from the following system of equations (the third one being an indi¤erence condition for the minor players):
The solution to this system of equations is w a = n¡2 2n¡3
: When ± tends to 1,¸tends to n¡2 n¡1 : Proposition 7 The unique symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of G(N; v; µ P ; ±) is as follows a) When selected as a proposer, the apex player proposes to form a coalition with each of the minor players with equal probability. b) When a minor player is selected as a proposer, he randomizes between proposing a coalition with the apex player (with probability
for the apex player and 1 2n ¡ 3 for a minor player.
Proof. It is easy to check that there is no equilibrium in which the minor players play pure strategies (see the proof of proposition 6).
Suppose a minor player proposes to the apex player with probabilitya nd to the other minor players with probability 1 ¡¸: The continuation payo¤s and¸are found from the following system of equations:
; w m = 1 2n¡3
;¸= 1 n¡1
:
Remark 8 Note that expected payo¤s are the same for both protocols.
The reason why payo¤s are the same for both protocols is that equilibrium strategies change so as to compensate changes in the protocol: if the protocol selects a player to be a proposer more often, equilibrium strategies adjust so that he becomes a responder less often and his expected payo¤ remains unchanged.
Since in equilibrium a winning coalition always forms without delay, we have w a + (n ¡ 1)w m = 1: If the minor players follow a mixed strategy in equilibrium, this condition together with the indi¤erence condition w a = (n ¡ 2)w m determines expected payo¤s regardless of the protocol. These payo¤s are such that players are indi¤erent between all the minimal winning coalitions they can propose, thus there is always such an equilibrium provided that the corresponding¸is indeed a probability, that is, a number between 0 and 1. If we restrict ourselves to protocols that give the same probability of being the proposer to all minor players, all values of µ a in the (open) interval ]0;
[ yield the same ex ante payo¤s: Outside this interval, the minor players no longer randomize, there is no room for strategies to compensate changes in the protocol (one would need¸< 0 or¸> 1) and the intuitive result that a player gets a higher expected payo¤ if he is more often selected to be the proposer is obtained.
Remark 9 Expected payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition.
We elaborate on this in the next section.
Remark 10 Consider any two protocols that yield the same expected payo¤s (for example, the egalitarian protocol and the proportional protocol). The payo¤ a player gets conditional on being the proposer is the same for both protocols; the same holds for the payo¤ a player gets as a responder.
As a responder, a player gets his expected payo¤ times the discount factor ±: As a proposer he must o¤er to the responders their expected payo¤ times ±: For any two protocols that yield the same expected payo¤s a player receives the same payo¤ as a responder and solves the same maximization problem as a proposer.
Remark 11
The proposer has an advantage that does not completely disappear in the limit when ± tends to 1.
The proposer is said to have an advantage if the payo¤ a player gets as proposer is higher than the payo¤ he gets as a responder. This advantage does not vanish in the limit when ± tends to 1, in contrast with the Rubinstein (1982) game. The reason is that in this game the impatience of the players is not the only source of advantage for the proposer; a second sort of advantage is the majority rule (as opposed to the unanimity rule). The proposer will o¤er to each responder ± times his continuation payo¤. Since the proposer only needs to form a minimal winning coalition, he "saves" the expected payo¤ of players outside the minimal winning coalition. Because expected payo¤s for the players are proportional to their number of votes, the proposer gets a payo¤ of at least one half.
Remark 12
The coalition of all minor players forms more often under a proportional protocol.
As we have argued above, the payo¤ a player gets as a proposer and the payo¤ he gets as a responder are the same for both protocols. If the protocol changes so that a player is selected more often to be a proposer, strategies change so that he is selected less often to be a responder to keep expected ex ante payo¤s unchanged. Moreover, since a player gets a higher payo¤ as a proposer rather than as a responder (see remark 11), his total probability of being in a coalition (that is, the sum of his probability of being a proposer and his probability of being a responder) must decrease as well.
The reasoning above implies that the apex player must be less often in a coalition under a proportional protocol, thus the coalition of all minor players must form more often.
We can calculate the concrete probabilities using propositions 6 and 7. Under an egalitarian protocol, each minor player proposes the coalition of all minor players with probability 1 n¡1 (in the limit when ± tends to 1). Since one of the minor players is selected to be the proposer with probability n¡1 n , this implies that the coalition of all minor players forms with probability
A coalition of the apex player with a given minor player forms with probability
(the apex player is selected with probability 1 n and proposes to a given minor player with probability 1 n¡1
; a given minor player is selected with probability 1 n and proposes to the apex player with probability n¡2 n¡1
). Thus, each minimal winning coalition is equally likely. Under a proportional protocol, each minor player proposes the coalition of all minor players with probability n¡2 n¡1
: Since a minor player is selected to be the proposer with probability n¡1 2n¡3 , this implies that the coalition of all minor players forms with probability ] for a coalition containing all minor players and depend on the protocol for a coalition containing the apex player and a minor player.
The …rst part of the remark follows from the fact that expected payo¤s are the same for all minor players and the equilibrium is symmetric.
As for the second part, we have argued above that the apex player will be in a coalition less often under the proportional protocol. Since his ex ante expected payo¤ remains unchanged, this implies that conditional on being in a coalition his payo¤ must be higher. We can calculate the exact (limit) expected payo¤ division using the equilibrium values of¸found in propositions 6 and 7 and the coalition probabilities computed above.
For the egalitarian protocol, a coalition of the apex player with a given minor player forms with probability ; and by the minor player with probability 1 n n¡2 n¡1
: As a proposer, the apex player gets 1 ¡ 1 2n¡3
; as a responder he gets n¡2 2n¡3
. His expected payo¤ conditional on being in the coalition is then
This value is close to 1 2 : For the proportional protocol, a coalition of the apex player and a given minor player forms with probability 1 2n¡3
. It is proposed by the apex player with probability 
That is, the division of payo¤s conditional on a coalition of the apex player and a minor player is proportional to the number of votes each of the two players has.
Apex games and the kernel
We saw in the previous section that expected equilibrium payo¤s of the game G(N; v; µ; ±) coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition provided that (N; v) is an apex game, µ is a protocol that treats all minor players equally and with 0 < µ a < 1 2 , and ± is close to 1 (cf. remarks 7 and 8). We show now that this is not coincidental.
De…nition of the kernel

11
Consider a cooperative game (N; v): Assume v(S)¸0 8S µ N and v(i) = 0 8i 2 N: An outcome of the game is denoted by (x; B) where x i denotes the payo¤ to the ith player and B´fB 1 ; :::; B n g the coalition structure (partition of N ) that was formed. The payo¤ vector is assumed to satisfy x i¸0 , i = 1; 2; :::; n P i2B j x i = v(B j ); j = 1; 2; :::; m A payo¤ vector satisfying these two conditions is called an imputation. The space of all imputations for the coalition structure B is denoted by X(B). De…nition 14 Let x be an imputation in a game (N; v) for an arbitrary coalition structure. The excess of a coalition S at x is e(S; x) := v(S) ¡ P i2S x i :
De…nition 15 Let (x; B) be an outcome for a cooperative game, and let k and l be two distinct players in a coalition B j of B. The surplus of k against l at x is
De…nition 16 Let (N; v) be a cooperative game and let B be a coalition structure. The kernel K(B) for B is K(B) := fx 2 X(B) : s k;l (x) > s l;k (x) =) x l = 0; for all k; l 2 B 2 B; k 6 = lg
The kernel was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) . The de…nition of the kernel included here is taken from Maschler (1992) . The two papers di¤er slightly in the terminology.
Suppose (N; v) is an apex game and consider the coalition structure ff1; 2g; f3g; f4g; :::; fngg (1 is the apex player): The kernel for this coalition structure predicts that 1 and 2 receive 1 2 each. Since the payo¤ for a coalition must equal its value, all singletons must receive zero. The surplus of 1 against 2 then equals 1 ¡ x 1 , whereas the surplus of 2 against 1 equals 1 ¡ x 2 : Thus x 1 = x 2 . Player 1 needs only one of the other players, whereas player 2 needs all of them; however, since all those players receive zero, this makes no di¤erence for payo¤s. This is somehow disappointing, because intuitively the apex player is stronger and it seems that he should get more than half.
For the grand coalition, the kernel predicts ( ): To see this, notice that all the minor players must get the same payo¤; call this payo¤ x 2 . The surplus of the apex player against a minor player then equals 1 ¡ x 2 ¡ x 1 , whereas the surplus of a minor player against the apex player equals 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)x 2 : The equality 1 ¡ x 2 ¡ x 1 = 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)x 2 together with x 1 + (n ¡ 1)x 2 = 1 (that is, x must be an imputation) yields the result. If we interpret apex games as weighted majority games, the kernel predicts payo¤s that are proportional to the number of votes of the players 12 .
Why expected equilibrium payo¤s coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition
We now come back to the equilibrium of the noncooperative game described in section 2. Expected equilibrium payo¤s follow from the indi¤erence condition for a minor player together with the fact that players propose winning coalitions and there is no delay in equilibrium (see remark 7). The indi¤erence condition of the minor player, w a = (n ¡ 2)w m , implies 1 ¡ w a = 1 ¡ (n ¡ 2)w m : Substracting w m from both sides we get 1 ¡ w a ¡ w m = 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)w m That is, in the language of the kernel, the surplus of the apex player against a minor player equals the surplus of a minor player against the apex player.
Because there is no delay in equilibrium (and players always propose winning coalitions), the sum of all expected payo¤s equals 1, that is w a + (n ¡ 1)w m = 1 In the language of the kernel, (w i ) i2N is an imputation.
Related literature
This section reviews some of the literature on apex games. This literature is divided in three groups: the stable demands literature, the two-stage literature and the imperfect competition literature.
Stable aspirations
The stable demands literature predicts that any minimal winning coalition may form. Given that a coalition forms, payo¤ division will be proportional 13 . Since probabilities are not assigned to each minimal winning coalition, there is no prediction of ex ante expected payo¤s. If the situation is modeled as an extensive form game (Bennett and van Damme (1991) , Bennett (1997) , Morelli (1998) ) the equilibrium strategies are not unique: the apex player can propose to any minor player, and each minor player can propose the minor players coalition or a coalition with the apex player. "Natural" assumptions on the selection of the …rst proposer (egalitarian or proportional protocols) and on the mixed strategies (each player plays all strategies that yield the same payo¤ with equal probability) do not lead to expected ex ante payo¤s proportional to the number of votes 14 . Ex post payo¤s are proportional to the number of votes; ex ante payo¤s may be proportional to the number of votes (if initial probabilities and mixed strategies are chosen in an appropriate way) but need not be so. On the other hand, given that a coalition forms the payo¤ division is always proportional and does not depend on the protocol or on who was the proposer. Thus, the stable demands approach makes robust predictions ex post, whereas the current approach makes robust predictions ex ante.
13
The rationale for this division varies across the stable demands literature. A simple justi…cation is the partnership condition: given two players, either each of them needs the other to get his payo¤ demands, or neither needs the other.
Two-stage models
The two-stage approach provides possible justi…cations for the 1 2 : 1 2 split in the two-person minimal winning coalition. This type of coalition, however, never arises in equilibrium and the "major" player always gets a zero payo¤.
A reason why the kernel assigns the unintuitive
split to a coalition of the apex player and a minor player is the assumption that, when players consider alternative coalitions, they assign to the other players the payo¤ they get in the current coalition structure. Hart and Kurz (1983) instead assume that payo¤s are given by the Owen value 15 , and that if a group of players deviates the new payo¤s are given by the Owen value of the new coalition structure. A coalition structure is then considered to be stable if no group of players can reorganize themselves in such a way that all its members are strictly better-o¤.
The payo¤ division corresponding to a coalition of the apex player with a minor player is
¢ if the other minor players are together in a coalition and
) if they remain singletons (the kernel makes the same prediction for both structures). This coalition structure is not stable because the apex player can form a coalition (larger than minimal winning) with other minor players. The coalition of all small players is stable if n¸5 and coalitions break up when one member leaves. Aumann and Myerson (1988) split in a twoplayer coalition is then justi…ed since communication is not possible among players in di¤erent coalitions, so that the apex and the minor player are in a symmetric situation. Because of this, the big player prefers to form a coalition larger than the "minimal winning".
In equilibrium, all minor players form a coalition. The reason is that, if any of them links with the apex player, the apex player will then link with his "optimal" number of minor players, and each minor player would get less than what he would get if he linked with all the other minor players.
15
The Owen value assigns to a player his average contribution, where the average is computed over the orderings that are "consistent" with the coalition structure, i.e., players arrive randomly but players in the same coalition arrive successively.
16
The Myerson value is the Shapley value of the graph-restricted game. Chatterjee et al. (1993) consider a proposal-making model in which a rule of order selects the …rst proposer and the order in which players respond to a proposal, and the …rst player to reject becomes the next proposer. They predict that a coalition of the apex player and a minor player will form and split the payo¤ equally regardless of the number of players. Expected payo¤s depend on the rule of order and the strategy of the apex player. If the …rst proposer is selected randomly and the apex player randomizes among all minor players expected payo¤s are ( 
Imperfect competition
):
The reason for the equal-split prediction is that the game fails to re ‡ect competition between the minor players.
Suppose the minor players propose to the apex player. A minor player who rejects an o¤er will propose to the apex player in the next period and get a continuation payo¤ z m = ±(1 ¡±z a ); this payo¤ is the same for all minor players and does not depend on the proposing strategy of the apex player: If the apex player rejects a proposal, he gets z a = ±(1 ¡ ±z m ) no matter to which minor player he proposes: These two equations determine z a and z m independently of the number of minor players. In the present paper, the payo¤ of a player who rejects a proposal depends on how often other players propose to him, so that competitive pressures are re ‡ected in the expected payo¤s of the players 17 .
Possible extensions?
The main result of this paper, namely the fact that expected payo¤s are proportional to the number of votes, easily extends to all simple games with one large player and n¡1 identical small players. It certainly does not extend to all weighted majority games. This section includes two counterexamples, one for the egalitarian protocol and one for the proportional protocol.
17
Note that in the game considered by Chatterjee et al. (1993) expected payo¤s and continuation payo¤s may be very di¤erent. Consider a protocol that always appoints a given minor player i to be the proposer: This implies that the expected payo¤ for a minor player j 6 = i (w j in the notation of this paper) equals 0; whereas his continuation payo¤ z i is approximately : In the game we consider there is a close relation between expected payo¤s and continuation payo¤s. Since nature selects a new proposer once a proposal is rejected, we have z i = ±w i :
Counterexample 1: egalitarian protocol
Consider a weighted majority game in which two large players have k¸2 votes each, 2k ¡ 1 players have one vote each and 2k votes are needed to obtain a majority. The number of players is then n = 2k + 1, and the total number of votes is 4k ¡ 1. There are two types of minimal winning coalitions: the two large players, and a large player together with k small players. Suppose expected ex ante payo¤s are proportional to the number of votes of the players; this implies that players will propose only minimal winning coalitions. A small player will then include one and only one of the large players in the coalition he proposes; a large player is indi¤erent between proposing to the other large player or to k minor players.
One may suspect that a large player cannot get a payo¤ proportional to his number of votes for n large enough. As n grows, a large player becomes a proposer less often, thus he must be a responder more often to keep his expected payo¤ equal to his proportion of votes
. Since the proportion of the total votes a large player has is roughly constant regardless of the number of players, his probability of being a responder must be close to 1 when the number of players is large. However, there is an upper bound to his probability of being the responder since a small player proposes to only one of the large players (together with k ¡ 1 small players).
The expected payo¤ for a large player w l must satisfy the following equation, where¸is the probability with which a large player proposes to the other large player
The maximum possible value of w l (corresponding to¸= 1) is smaller than k 4k¡1 for any k¸2 ! One can prove that in equilibrium a small player will propose a coalition of himself and the two large players with positive probability and a large player receives k ¡ 1 times what a small player receives instead of k times. Thus, large players are underpaid and coalitions larger than minimal form.
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This formula takes into account that the small players must propose a coalition to each of the large players with probability
Counterexample 2: proportional protocol
Consider a weighted majority game with four players, one of them with 3 votes, two of them with 2 votes and one of them with 1 vote. 5 votes are needed to obtain a majority, and thus there are two types of minimal winning coalitions: a player with 3 votes together with one of the players with 2 votes, or the two players with 2 votes together with the player with 1 vote. Thus, the largest and the smallest player are never together in a minimal winning coalition. If expected ex ante payo¤s are proportional, only minimal winning coalitions form in equilibrium, thus the player with 3 votes must propose to one of the players with 2 votes, and the player with 1 vote to both of them. A player with 2 votes can propose two minimal winning coalitions, one including the largest player and the other including the smallest player.
Suppose that expected equilibrium payo¤s are proportional to the number of votes under a proportional protocol. If ¹ is the probability that a player with 2 votes proposes to the largest player, the following equations must be satis…ed: ; describing the expected payo¤ for the largest player. ; describing the expected payo¤ for the smallest player.
For ± close to 1, ¹ needs to be close to 1 2 for the largest player to receive a proportional payo¤, and close to 0 for the smallest player to receive a proportional payo¤, a contradiction.
Concluding remarks
This paper considers an application of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) bargaining model to apex games. Expected ex ante payo¤s are found to be proportional to the number of votes of the players, and this result is robust to (not too extreme) changes in the protocol. The probability of a coalition being formed as well as the expected division of payo¤s given that a coalition is formed depends on the protocol.
The proposer has two sources of advantage in this game: the impatience of the players and the majority (rather than unanimity) rule. In fact, a proposer always gets more than half of the total payo¤ regardless of the number of players. The reason is that each responder receives a payo¤ proportional to his share of the total votes, and, since only minimal winning coalitions form, the sum of these shares is always smaller than . This is striking if we think of large apex games with a minor player selected as a proposer.
Expected payo¤s proportional to the number of votes may be desirable for fairness reasons. However, the fairness argument only applies for homogeneous majority games (games in which each minimal winning coalition has the same number of votes). This paper concerns homogeneous apex games only. If, the game is not homogeneous, the result that all minor players have the same expected payo¤ is not obviously attractive. Moreover, the assumption that the protocol treats all the minor players equally and the requirement that the minor players follow similar strategies are less reasonable if the game is not homogeneous.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5. Corollary 4 implies that the apex player will propose a coalition of the form f1; ig (i 6 = 1) whereas a minor player i will propose f1; ig or N nf1g: Symmetry requires each minor player to propose coalition N nf1g (and thus coalition f1; ig) with the same probability.
The equilibrium expected payo¤ for a minor player is then given by the following expression:
where µ m denotes the probability each minor player has to be the proposer, µ a denotes the probability for the apex player to be the proposer (µ a = 1¡(n¡1) µ m ),¸denotes the probability that a minor player proposes to the apex player, and ¹ i denotes the probability that the apex player proposes to player i ( P j2N nf1g ¹ j = 1): Solving for w i in (2), we get
We can distinguish two cases: a)¸> 0 (the minor players propose to the apex player with positive probability). b)¸= 0 (the minor players never propose to the apex player). Case a):¸> 0 implies w i i = 1 ¡ ±w 1 = w j j 8i; j 2 N nf1g: Thus, given two minor players i and j, w i can only be di¤erent from w j if ¹ i 6 = ¹ j : We now prove that ¹ i = ¹ j 8i; j 2 N nf1g:
Suppose not, say, ¹ i > ¹ j : From (3), this implies w i > w j : But this in turn implies ¹ i = 0 (the apex player will never propose to player i; since he can do better by proposing to player j), a contradiction. Thus ¹ i = ¹ j = 1 n¡1 (since by Corollary 4 the apex player always proposes to a minor player) and w i = w j for all i; j 2 N nf1g:
Case b): Take a player j such that ¹ j > 0: The apex player will only propose to a minor player if he is (one of) the cheapest, thus it must be the case that w j = min k2Nnf1g w k :
Suppose not all minor players have the same equilibrium expected payo¤. Then 9i 2 N nf1g s.t. w i > w j : By assumption¸= 0; so each minor player proposes the coalition of all minor players in equilibrium. Moreover, optimization by the apex player implies ¹ i = 0:
Equilibrium expected payo¤s for i and j are then given by the following expressions:
w i = µ m (1 ¡ X k2Nnf1;i;jg ±w k ¡ ±w j ) + (n ¡ 2)µ m ±w i (4) w j = µ m (1 ¡ X k2N nf1;i;jg ±w k ¡ ±w i ) + (n ¡ 2)µ m ±w j + µ a ¹ j ±w j
Substracting (5) from (4) and re-arranging terms, we get
where ¢ denotes w i ¡ w j : Since 1 ¡ (n ¡ 1)±µ m > µ a > 0 and µ a ¹ j ±w j > 0; we get ¢ < 0, a contradiction. Therefore, all minor players must have the same equilibrium payo¤.
